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STATUTES CITED
§41-6a-304 UCA. Obeying devices - Effect of
improper position, illegibility, or absence Presumption of lawful placement and
compliance with chapter.
(1) Except as otherwise directed by a peace
officer or other authorized personnel under
Section 41-6a-209 and except as provided under
Section 41-6a-212 for authorized emergency
vehicles, the operator of a vehicle shall obey the
instructions of any traffic-control device placed or
held in accordance with this chapter.
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(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which a
traffic-control device is required, may not be
enforced if at the time and place of the alleged
violation the traffic-control device is not in proper
position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an
ordinarily observant person.
(b) The provisions of this chapter are effective
independently of the placement of a traffic-control
device unless the provision requires the
placement of a traffic-control device prior to its
enforcement.
(3) A traffic-control device placed or held in a
position approximately conforming to the
requirements of this chapter is presumed to have
been placed or held by the official act or direction
of a highway authority or other lawful authority,
unless the contrary is established by competent
evidence.
(4) A traffic-control device placed or held under
this chapter and purporting to conform to the
lawful requirements of the device is presumed to
comply with the requirements of this chapter,
unless the contrary is established by competent
evidence.
1. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 2, 2005
General Session

§ 72-6-114 UCA. Restricting use of or closing
highway - Penalty for failure to observe
barricade, warning light, etc.
(1) A highway authority may close or restrict travel
on a highway under their jurisdiction due to
construction, maintenance work, or emergency.
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(2) If a highway or portion of a highway is closed
or restricted to travel, a highway authority shall
cause suitable barriers and notices to be posted
and maintained in accordance with Section 41-6a301.
(3) A person who willfully fails to observe any
barricade, warning light, sign, or flagman, used in
accordance with this section, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
1. Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session
77-23-102. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a
roadblock procedure where enforcement officers
stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor
vehicles traveling on highways and roads and
subject those vehicles to inspection or testing and
the drivers or occupants to questioning or the
production of documents.
(2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs,
heads of law enforcement agencies, and all
supervisory enforcement officers of sergeant rank
or higher.
(3) "Emergency circumstances" means
circumstances where enforcement officers
reasonably believe road conditions, weather
conditions, or persons present a significant
hazard to persons or the property of other persons.
(4) "Enforcement officer" includes:
(a) peace officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter
13, Peace Officer Classifications;
(b) correctional officers as defined in Title 53,
Chapter 13;
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
340 W 100 N, Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone 801-231-5745
VII
Defendant/Appellant

(c) special function officers as defined and under
the restrictions of Title 53, Chapter 13; and
(d) federal officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter
13.
(5) "Magistrate" includes all judicial officers
enumerated in Subsection 77-1-3(4).
(6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles as defined
in Title 41, Chapter 1a.
1. Amended by Chapter 282, 1998 General
Session

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION:
Article /, Section 2. [All political power
inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority
for their equal protection and benefit, and they
have the right to alter or reform their government
as the public welfare may require.

Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches
forbidden ~ Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

Miscellaneous Attachments:
State of Minnesotta v. David Shafer Anderson
620N.W.2d56
State of Wisconsin v. Shawn A. Timm
Appeal No 02-0162-CR (not published)
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ISSUES PRESENTED

1. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "LOCAL TRAFFIC ONLY", WHEN USED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH A ROAD CLOSED SIGN, IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE?

2. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE OFFICER JEPPSEN LACKED
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR EFFECTING A TRAFFIC STOP AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS VEHICLE IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION?

3. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
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CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A
RESULT OF A "DE FACTO" UNAUTHORIZED ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT (ROADBLOCK ) THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23-104 UCA AND WAS
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION?

4. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAWS DOCTRINE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION?
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant anticipates the issue presented in this appeal will be adequately
addressed by the parties' brief but appellant gladly welcomes the opportunity for
oral argument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 25, 2008 a criminal information (4:25 & 5:1-10) was filed in
Layton City Court charging Appellant-Defendant with the Restricted Use of a
Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA. On August 25, 2008 AppellantDefendant, following a bench trial, was convicted of violating §72-6-114 UCA
(67:20 - 25 & 68:1-13) and was ordered to pay a fine of $120.00 (69:8-12).

This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to a Notice of
Appeal from the Judgement of Conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 18, 2008, at approximately 5:30 PM appellant was driving
eastbound on Gentile Street in Layton, Utah. Portions of Gentile Street were
under construction and barricades had been placed on Gentile Street at 3200
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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West and at 2200 West. The barricades were posted with signs "Road Closed Local Traffic Only". The barricades effectively restricted travel on the portion of
Gentile Street between 3200 West and 2200 West to "Local Traffic Only". The
barricades were placed in such a manner that traffic could still enter into and
travel on Gentile Street in the area between 3200 West and 2200 West. There
were various signs, including detour signs, that had been placed on Gentile
Street to provide warning to vehicles approaching the barricades. None of the
signs provided information to motorists informing them of the extent of the
closure. Motorists approaching the "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only" signs were
left to guess the extent of the closure on Gentile Street and therefore were left to
guess whether or not their destination was within the "Local Traffic Only" area.
Your appellant admits that he drove through the opening in the barricades at
3200 West Gentile and continued traveling eastbound on Gentile Street. Your
appellant was stopped by Layton Police Officers at approximately 2500 West
Gentile. Your appellant observed that there were three marked Layton Police
Vehicles, on the north side of Gentile Street, parked perpendicular to Gentile
Street, with the vehicles facing Gentile Street. Your appellant also observed
three Layton Police Officers, on foot, in the center of the road stopping vehicles
and talking to the drivers. As your appellant approached the officers your
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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appellant observed two eastbound vehicles that had been stopped and also
observed several westbound vehicles that had been stopped. Your appellant
waited for several minutes while one of the eastbound vehicles received what
appeared to be a citation. After waiting several minutes, and without having been
contacted by an officer, your appellant began to make a U-turn. Your appellant
then received a hand signal from one of the officers in the road, Officer Applonie,
indicating that your appellant was not free to leave the area. Your appellant was
contacted several minutes later by Officer Applonie who asked for appellants
drivers license, registration, and asked appellant questions regarding the
appellant's destination. Your appellant waited several minutes longer and was
then contacted by a second Layton City Police Officer, Officer Jeppsen, who
issued your appellant a citation for Restricted Use of a Closed Highway in
Violation of §72-6-114 UCA.

During direct examination Officer Jeppsen testified "The construction
company that was in charge of the project had issued tags that would hang on
your rearview mirror, and they had issued those to the residents of the area so
that they could be more easily identified as being local traffic" (9:13-17). Officer
Jeppsen also stated that "he (the appellant/defendant) did not have a decal in the
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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window" (9:12,13).

During cross examination officer Jeppsen testified that Gentile Street,
between 2200 West and 3200 West is a public Street (17:17-19).

During cross examination by the appellant Officer Jeppsen was questioned
regarding the methodology and the mechanics of the Layton Police Officers that
were involved in enforcing the closure of Gentile Street on the afternoon of April
18, 2008. Officer Jeppsen testified that there were three officers involved in
enforcement activities on Gentile Street (16:22, 22). Officer Jeppsen further
stated that the other officers involved were Sergeant Andrew Joseph and Officer
Applonie (19:14). Officer Jeppsen testified that he and Sergeant Joseph and
Officer Applonie had parked their patrol cars on the north side of Gentile Street
(16:20-24) and the officers were on foot (17:1). Officer Jeppsen testified that "we
were just watching cars go by, and if they didn't have a decal in the window, we
would just approach on foot at the window and make the traffic stop that way"
(17:2-5).

During cross examination Officer Jeppsen was asked if the officers stopped
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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every vehicle that was traveling on Gentile Street that did not have a decal.
Officer Jeppsen testified that they stopped "As many - - as many vehicles as we
could handle" (17:8). Officer Jeppsen also testified that on occasions there were
vehicles that had been stopped that were backed up behind one another (17:1216).

During cross examination Officer Jeppsen testified that there were
numerous reasons a vehicle without a "decal in the window" would be allowed to
travel within the closed portion of Gentile Street. Appellant argues that if Layton
Police were allowing some vehicles that were not displaying the tag/decal in their
window to travel on the closed portion of Gentile Street it can be presumed that
those vehicles were allowed to travel the road because they were not violating the
road closure. Appellant also argues that if non-residents of the area were
allowed to travel on the closed portion of Gentile Street it can be presumed that
those vehicles were allowed to travel the road because they were not violating the
road closure. Officer Jeppsen testified that if a motorist was going to one of the
businesses in the area (20:24, 25 & 21:1-11) the motorist would not receive a
citation. Officer Jeppsen further testified that a mail carrier (22:11, 12), an LDS
home teacher (22:24, 25 & 23:1), or a teenager going into the area to visit a
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
340 West 100 North, Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone 801-231-5745
-8Defendant/Appellant

friend (23:8-10) would not have received a citation. Officer Jeppsen also testified
that if any person were traveling to a residence located within the closed portion
of Gentile Street they would not have received a citation (23:4-7).

Officer Jeppsen's response seems to indicate that if a motorist, traveling
within the closed portion of Gentile Street, could articulate a destination within the
road closure area, regardless of the motorists purpose of traveling to that
destination, then the motorist would not receive a citation. It can be presumed
that they would not have received a citation because they were not violating the
road closure.

During cross examination Officer Jeppsen was asked by appellant "Is there
any way - - was there any way by looking at my vehicle prior to making the traffic
stop that you had reasonable suspicion that I was not local traffic?" (23:15 -17).
Officer Jeppsen's response was in part "Just that you didn't have a decal as a
resident" (23:18). Appellant contends that driving a vehicle through a
construction zone without displaying a placard or decal issued by the construction
contractor - is not a crime or a traffic offense - and does not constitute reasonable
suspicion for the purpose of making a traffic stop.
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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Officer Jeppsen testified during cross examination that the stop of
appellant's car was "based on probable cause that - - that you were not a local
resident" (24:12, 13). When asked to articulate that probable cause Officer
Jeppsen testified "We made the stops because you - - the vehicles that didn't
have the resident decals are the vehicles we stopped that day" (24:15-7). Officer
Jeppsen then acknowledged that there were many exceptions that would allow a
person without a "sticker" to drive in the closed area (24:18-21).

Officer Jeppsen also stated during cross examination that they did not have
a court order authorizing an administrative traffic check point (30:6-8).

ARGUMENT 1

1. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE
OF A CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHRASE "LOCAL TRAFFIC ONLY", WHEN
USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A ROAD CLOSED SIGN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE?
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Appellant drove on a portion of Gentile Street in Layton that was posted
with a sign "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only". Appellant contends that had the
road been posted with only a "Road Closed" sign that the appellant, or any other
motorist, would have committed a perse violation by driving on the road.
Appellant contends that the additional language on the signage of "Local Traffic
Only" changed the road closure so that it was no longer a perse violation.
Appellant contends that because the language "Local Traffic Only" is not defined
by State statute nor is it defined by the Federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices the term "Local Traffic Only" is unconstitutionally vague and is subject to
multiple interpretations by a reasonable person. The failure to identify the
boundaries and extent of the closure contributed to vagueness and the inability of
a reasonable person to determine the definition of "Local Traffic Only". The
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have ruled that a
statute must be sufficiently definite so as to discourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357; State v.
Honie, 2002 UT 4 at 1[31. The United States Supreme Court has stated that to
avoid unconstitutional vagueness, a statute must "establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement" such that it avoids entrusting "lawmaking to the
moment-to-moment judgement of the policeman on his beat." Kolenderv.
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358, 360. The testimony of Officer Jeppsen during trial
makes it clear that his interpretation of the term "Local Traffic Only" was a
"moment-to-moment judgement" by Officer Jeppsen and the Layton City Police
officers operating the roadblock. Layton City Police Department's interpretation
of the term "Local Traffic Only" has led to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by Layton police officers.

The United States Supreme Court has stated "a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process of law." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucy,
234 U.S. 216, 234 U.S. 221.

The United States Supreme Court in Conally v. General Construction
Co. 269 U. S. 385 has said:
"The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful
cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to
answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates
are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an
uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements
constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary
person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is
lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing
of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation,
should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen
may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the
courts upon another."

Appellant does not contend that §72-6-114 UCA is unconstitutionally vague
but does contend that the phrase "Local Traffic Only" when used in conjunction
with a road closed sign is unconstitutionally vague and allows for the unlawful
discretionary, moment-to-moment interpretation and enforcement of the law by
law enforcement officers.

Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
340 West 100 North, Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone 801-231-5745
•13Defendant/Appellant

ARGUMENT 2

2. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE OFFICER JEPPSEN LACKED
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR EFFECTING A TRAFFIC STOP AND FOR
THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS VEHICLE IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION?

A traffic stop is a "seizure" and appellant was subject to the protection of the
Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of
the Utah State Constitution. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct.
1769,1772 (1996); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55. In order for law
enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for a limited investigatory purpose an
officer must have an individualized, reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. The validity of an investigative stop is governed by the objective

Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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standard of reasonableness set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968).
Pursuant to this objective standard, an officer may not effectuate a stop based
on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" but may only act on
"specific and articulable facts" which give rise to reasonable suspicion that the
person committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Terry v.
Ohio, at 22. Trial court testimony revealed that law enforcement officers were
stopping every vehicle that was being operated in the closure area that was not
displaying a placard. Appellant contends that law enforcement officers lacked
articulable, individualized, reasonable suspicion for making the traffic stops. The
posting of the sign "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only" removed the offense from
being a perse violation. Local residents had been given a placard to display in
their vehicle to identify their vehicle as "local traffic". However, many other
drivers not displaying placards could legally and lawfully drive in and through the
area of the closure. Testimony elicited during the trial identified many instances
where a person without a placard could lawfully drive into the area of the "Local
Traffic Only" closure. Officers who were stopping vehicles not displaying
placards had no way of knowing whether the vehicle being stopped was actually
"local traffic" or something other than "local traffic". Officers were only able to
develop their reasonable suspicion for the stop after the stop had been made
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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and the driver had been questioned about his intended destination and the
purpose of his travel into the area of the "Local Traffic Only" closure. The Utah
Court of Appeals, in State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, is quoted:

1111 The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S Const. Amend. IV.
"The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
extends to a person's automobile." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT
App 262, m 12, 988P.2d 7 (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). A law enforcement officer may stop
a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion the vehicle
is being operated in violation of the law. See id.

The reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop
of an automobile must be judged against an objective standard
- that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts
known to the officer, which taken together with rational
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
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inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's
personal security.

i d "In determining whether this objective standard has been
met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the
officer immediately before the stop." Jd "The burden of
establishing those articulable facts falls on the State." State v.
Kohl, 2000 UT 3 5 , V 1 , 999 P.2d 7.

The Utah Court of Appeals, quoting State v. Bean, 869 P. 2d at 988, in
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, said:

1J18. "[A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable
suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." State v. Bean, 869 P. 2d at 988; see
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15(1999) ("A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
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committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.") "While the required level of suspicion is lower than
the standard for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there
are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support
reasonable suspicion." City of St. George v. Carter, 945
P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Case.
884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))), certdenied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). In determining whether
this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily
centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before
the stop." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262,1J12, 988 P.2d
7.

The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
418 (1981) has said:
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The second element contained in the idea that an assessment
of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the
concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing . . . .

The information that was available to an officer observing traffic driving
through the closed portion of Gentile Street would be equally consistent with a
conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was acting lawfully as it would be with the
conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was not acting lawfully.
Appellant further cites two cases that, while not precedent setting in Utah,
directly correlate to the fact circumstances of Appellant's case. The cases are
State of Wisconsin v. Shawn A. Timm, Appeal No. 02-0162-CR (Not
Published) and State v. Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56. These cases involve
traffic stops of motorists traveling on roads marked "Road Closed - Local Traffic
Only". Both courts made the determination that officers lacked reasonable
suspicion for stopping motorists for simply traveling on a road marked "Road
Closed - Local Traffic Only".
In State of Utah v. Henry Thomas DeBooy, the Utah Supreme Court is
quoted:
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"Broad-based, suspicionless inquiries are reminiscent of the
much hated and feared general warrants issued by the British
Crown in colonial days, where British officers were given
blanket authority to search wherever they pleased and for
whatever might pique their interest. It was precisely this type
of activity that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
prohibit. Indeed, the use of general warrants was an important
factor giving rise to the American Revolution. See_Stanford v.
State, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). This state's early settlers
were themselves no strangers to the abuses of general
warrants. Underlying the abuse of the general warrant was
the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating
known crimes to investigating individuals for the purpose of
finding criminal behavior. A free society cannot tolerate such a
practice".
In State of Wisconsin V. Shawn A. Timm (Un-published Opinion of the
Court of Appeals, see id.) Timm drove through a construction area that was
controlled by barricades indicating "Road Closed" and "Local Traffic Only". The
court of appeals ruled:
fl 11. "It is undisputed that the roadway was not closed to
traffic. Rather, it was open, but only to local traffic."
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals went on to say
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fl 12. "We do not doubt that drivers sometimes violate "local
traffic only" regulations in construction zones at all times of the
day or night. But such generalized suspicion does not
translate into unbridled police authority to stop and detain all
vehicles entering into such areas. In such a situation, the
police must accumulate additional information which
transforms the initial "hunch" into a "reasonable suspicion"
before a Terry stop is permitted."
Appellant cites another similar ruling from the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
In State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56; a Wright
County officer stopped Anderson for driving around a barricade marked "road
closed local traffic only." The record reflects that although the road was under
construction, it was passable. In this case the Court of appeals is quoted in their
ruling as saying:
"the records contains no evidence of circumstances sufficient
to warrant the investigative stop of appellant. Because the
stop was based on enforcing traffic movement restrictions in a
specific geographic area , it was not wholly whimsical. But the
officer stopped the appellant without any reason to believe that
a violation of the law was occurring. The information available
to the officer was consistent with a conclusion that appellant
was acting lawfully."
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Finally, "The right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and right
i

most valued by civilized men" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting), is a right that law enforcement officials and all
citizens must respect and actively seek to protect.
The stop of appellant's car was made without reasonable suspicion. The
admission by appellant that the appellant was traveling through the closed portion
of Gentile Street to reach a destination outside of the road closure area must be
suppressed because Officer Jeppsen did not have reasonable suspicion to make
the stop. An unlawful search and seizure cannot by justified by what it
fortuitously manages to produce. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595
(1948) "[A] search is not made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad
when it starts and does not change character from its success". Accordingly, the
evidence obtained as the fruits of the unlawful stop of appellant's vehicle must be
suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

ARGUMENT 3

SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A
RESULT OF A "DE FACTO" UNAUTHORIZED ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
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CHECKPOINT (ROADBLOCK ) THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23-104 UCA AND WAS
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION?

§77-23-102 (1) UCA states: "Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a
roadblock procedure where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated
sequence of, motor vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those
vehicles to inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or
the production of documents.

Appellant contends that the actions and conduct of Sergeant Joseph,
Officer Applonie and Officer Jeppsen were consistent with "a roadblock
procedure where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated sequence of,
motor vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those vehicles to
inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or the
production of documents" §77-23-102 (1). The three officers were stopping all
vehicles not displaying a placard or a decal (17:2-5). Their conduct was
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tantamount to "stopping all, or a designated sequence of, motor vehicles and
subject those vehicles to inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to
questioning or the production of documents".

Trial court testimony revealed that at the time the appellant was issued a
citation that there were three Layton City officers working within the closure area
at approximately 2500 West Gentile. Court testimony indicated that the officers
had their vehicles parked perpendicular to Gentile Street on the north side of the
street. The three officers were on foot in the middle of the road stopping all
vehicles not displaying an authorized placard. Officers who were stopping
vehicles not displaying placards had no way of knowing whether the vehicle
being stopped was actually a vehicle that constituted "local traffic" or something
other than "local traffic". The information that was available to an officer
observing traffic driving through the closed portion of Gentile Street would be
"equally consistent with a conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was acting
lawfully as it would be with the conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was not
acting lawfully" State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d
56.
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In State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56,
Anderson also argued that the officer's conduct along with his actions in
stopping numerous cars entering into the "road closed local traffic only" area
constituted an unlawful checkpoint. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed
with Anderson's claim when it said:

"Appellant contends that the stops, which involved numerous
cars, constituted an unlawful checkpoint. The argument
merely restates appellant's concerns about the stop; a series
of stops not individually justified based on appellant's or
anyone else's conduct could only be part of a checkpoint. The
state concedes that a checkpoint would not be justified under
these circumstances."

The United States Supreme Court, because of valid Fourth Amendment
concerns, has placed very restrictive guidelines for law enforcement use of
roadblocks or administrative traffic checkpoints. § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23104 UCA was created to provide clear constitutional guidelines for Utah law
enforcement officers wishing to conduct Administrative Traffic Checkpoints. The
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conduct and actions of Layton Police officers showed clear disregard for Utah
Law, the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution. The traffic
checkpoint being operated by the Layton Police Department on April 18, 2008
was conducted without the approval of a magistrate. At the time the traffic
checkpoint was being operated law enforcement officers were not "acting
pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest warrant". (§77-23-103 (1));
they did not have "probable cause to arrest or search". (§77-23-103 (2)); they
did not have "reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is
occurring". (§77-23-103 (3)); and they were not "acting under emergency
circumstances". (§77-23-103 (4)).

ARGUMENT 4

SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF
A CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
LAWS DOCTRINE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2 OF THE
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION?

The prosecutor violated the Shondel Doctrine, as clarified by State V.
Williams, Utah App 244 (2008), in discriminating against the appellant by
charging appellant with Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6114 UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) rather than the lesser included offense of
Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 UCA (A Class
C Misdemeanor). The prosecutor made several offers to the appellant to reduce
the charge from the Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114
UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) to the lesser included offense of Failure to Obey a
Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 USA (A Class C Misdemeanor)
if the appellant would enter a guilty plea to the lesser charge. During pre-trial
conferences the prosecutor indicated that he had made the same offer to other
defendants charged with the same violation. The appellant contends that the
prosecutor abused his prosecutorial discretion in a discriminatory manner by filing
a criminal information for the more serious charge of the Restricted Use of Closed
Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) against only
those defendants who refused to enter a guilty plea to the reduced charge Failure
to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 USA (A Class C
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se
340 West 100 North, Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone 801-231-5745
-27Defendant/Appellant

Misdemeanor). The Utah Uniform Bail Schedule lists the recommended bail for
Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 UCA at
$80.00. The Utah Uniform Bail Schedule lists the recommended bail for the
Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA at $580.00.
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's abuse of his discretionary authority may
have tended to persuade an innocent person to plead guilty to a lesser violation
rather than face the uncertainty of a trial on a more serious charge. Further,
appellant's conduct and the nature of appellant's violation was no different that
the conduct and nature of the violation of those motorists that were ultimately
charged with Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304
USA (A Class C Misdemeanor).

The Shondel Doctrine, as clarified by Williams, allows a prosecutor
discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute a person for a more serious
offense or a lesser included offense - but that discretion must be based upon the
facts, evidence, and circumstances of the conduct - and not be based upon the
willingness of a defendant to agree to plead guilty to a lesser included offense. In
quoting State of Utah v. Williams, Utah App 244 (2008), the Utah Supreme
Court said:
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U 10. "The notion that a prosecutor may be empowered to
charge two people who have engaged in the same conduct
with different crimes carrying different penalties is one that
offends our sense of fairness. We have also found it to violate
the guarantees of equal protection of the law enshrined in the
United States Constitution. E. q.. State v. Shondel. 453 P. 2d
146,147 (Utah 1969). We have come to characterize what
has come to be known as the Shondel doctrine this way:
"Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all
those who are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal
laws must be written so that... the exact same conduct is not
subject to different penalties depending upon which of two
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge."
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests that the
judgement of conviction and sentence be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RONALD CHARLES BARTON, Pro Se
Appellant
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Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.

In reviewing pretrial suppression orders, appellate
court independently reviews the facts and determines
as a matter of law whether the trial court erred in its
decision.

David Shafer ANDERSON, Appellant.
No. C5-00-855.

Dec. 19,2000.
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3511 On Criminal Charges
Defendant moved to suppress evidence discovered
during traffic stop. The District Court, Wright
County, Bruce R. Douglas, J., denied motion
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Crippen,
J., held that officer had no basis to stop defendant for
driving around barricade marked "road closed local
traffic only."
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In order to conduct a stop for limited investigatory
purposes, an officer must have reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity; all that is required is
that the stop be not the product of mere whim,
caprice, or idle curiosity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(2.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Ordinarily, an officer's observation of a trafficlaw violation will provide an objective basis to
support a stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

HI Automobiles 48A €=>349(2.1)

respondent.
David G. Roston, Segal, Roston & Berris, P.L.L.P.,
Minneapolis, for appellant.

Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge,
CRIPPEN. Judge, and PETERSON, Judge.

48A Automobiles

OPINION

48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(2.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Officer had no basis for stopping motorist for driving
around barricade marked "road closed local traffic
only"; officer had no reason to believe that a violation
of law was occurring, and there was no evidence in
record to indicate that any citizens had violated or
were violating local-traffic-only restriction. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

*5 7 Syllabus by the Court

To have an articulable basis for a stop, the officer
must have some knowledge or suspicion that the
conduct observed is not wholly lawful.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, and Thomas
N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, Anne L. Mohaupt,
Assistant Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, for

CRIPPEN. Judge.
Appellant disputes the trial court's refusal to suppress
evidence obtained when an officer stopped appellant
for passing by a barricade marked "road closed local
traffic only." Because the evidence shows that the
officer had no reason to suspect that appellant's
conduct was not wholly lawful, we reverse.

FACTS

A Wright County officer stopped appellant Anderson
for driving around a barricade marked "road closed
local traffic only." Although the road was under
construction, it was passable, and there were other
roads that led into the area. The officer stationed at
the barricade was engaged in stopping every car to
verify whether the driver was an area resident.

The record contains some evidence that the officer
stopped numerous cars but is devoid of any evidence
regarding the duration and frequency of the stops or
any suggestion that the officer knew appellant or any
other drivers were using the road for purposes other
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than local-traffic use.

believe

that

appellant

was

acting

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to
suppress the evidence?

ANALYSIS

T11 In reviewing pretrial suppression orders, this court
independently reviews the facts and determines as a
matter of law whether the trial court erred in its
decision. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98
(Minn. 1999).

121131 In order to conduct a stop for limited
investigatory purposes, an officer "must have
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity." State v. Munson. 594 N.W.2d 128, 136
(Minn.1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,2122, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
"All that is required is that the stop be not the
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity."
Marben v. State. Dep't of Pub. Safety. 294 N.W.2d
697, 699 (Minn.1980) (quotation omitted).
Ordinarily, an officer's observation of a trafficlaw violation will provide an objective basis to
support a stop. State v. George. 557 N.W.2d 575,
578(Minn.l997).

[41 The state insists that, under these circumstances,
the officer had reason to believe that appellant might
have been violating the law because Minn.Stat. $
160.27. subd. 5(14) (1998), provides that it is a
misdemeanor to drive around a barricade erected to
close a road to public traffic. But the state does not
deny, based on the record here, that the officer had no

Under these circumstances, the officer's belief that a
traffic offense was occurring was not based on a
reasonable, articulable suspicion. Cf. United States v.
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581. 1586-87.
104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (finding that a series of wholly
lawful acts, when taken together, can warrant further
investigation). In *58Britton, the Minnesota Supreme
Court evaluated the constitutionality of stopping
someone solely for driving a car with a broken
window. State v. Britton. 604 N.W.2d 84. 88-89
(Minn.2000). The court found that the record
contained no evidence of an assessment, based either
on training or experience, that appellant's broken
window indicated that the car was stolen; thus, the
court concluded that evidence obtained as a result of
the stop should have been excluded. Id. at 89.

Here, the record contains no evidence of
circumstances sufficient to warrant the investigative
stop of appellant. Because the stop was based on
enforcing traffic movement restrictions in a specific
geographic area, it was not wholly whimsical. But the
officer stopped appellant without any reason to
believe that a violation of law was occurring. The
information available to the officer was consistent
with a conclusion that appellant was acting lawfully.
In fact, there is no evidence in the record to indicate
that any citizens had violated or were violating the
local-traffic-only restriction. Appellant claims that he
was within the broad parameters of the definition of
local traffic and he was never charged with the
misdemeanor offense.

The United States Supreme Court noted the illegality
of stops such as the one involved in this case when it
evaluated warrantless stops to enforce the National
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Prohibition Act:

from the general requirement of individualized
suspicion).

It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways
to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45
S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). We conclude
that the impact of this decision is not diminished
by the fact that the stop of appellant, in a limited
geographic area where violations might occur, was
less than wholly whimsical. The officer could not
reasonably state a basis to stop a driver without
articulation of more specific cause to believe that
the driver was not acting lawfully.

Appellant contends that the stops, which involved
numerous cars, constituted an unlawful checkpoint.
This argument merely restates appellant's concerns
about the stop; a series of stops not individually
justified based on appellant's or anyone else's conduct
could only be part of a checkpoint. The state
concedes that a checkpoint would not be justified
under these circumstances. See Ascher v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety. 519 N.W.2d 183, 186
(Minn. 1994) (articulating the burden for departure

DECISION

The record does not contain sufficient evidence to
justify the stop of appellant. The motion to suppress
the evidence should have been granted and the trial
court erred in denying it. Because the state does not
suggest that prosecution of the case is viable after this
suppression, we reverse.

Reversed.

Minn.App.,2000.
State v. Anderson
620 N.W.2d 56

END OF DOCUMENT
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County: BRUCE SCHMIDT, Judge.
Reversed and cause remanded.
f 1. NETTESHEIM, P. J.- Shawn A. Timm appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1 )(a). Timm contends
that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer did
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not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. We agree. We reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
f2. On August 19, 2001, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer Adam Streubel was driving down Main
Street in the city of Neenah. Main Street was under construction from Green Bay Road through to a new
overpass and was controlled by barricades on both sides of Lake Street, indicating "road closed" and
"local traffic only." As Streubel approached Lake Street traveling west on Main Street, he observed a red
truck traveling eastbound on Main Street cross Lake Street by maneuvering around the barricade and
continuing down Main Street. Streubel turned around and followed the truck, intending to stop it for
traveling through a construction area. Streubel observed the truck turn onto Harrison Street at the bottom
of the overpass. Harrison Street had not yet been paved and the truck went down a six-inch drop to a
gravel surface. Streubel followed the truck onto Harrison Street and activated his emergency lights. The
truck pulled over and Streubel made contact with Timm.
f3. Streubel observed that Timmfs driver's license indicated a Menasha, Wisconsin address. When asked
why he was in the construction area, Timm indicated that he was on his way to Gord's Bar and was
unfamiliar with the area. Timm admitted having seen the barricades. During the course of his
conversation with Timm, Streubel observed that Timm's "eyelids were heavy.... His eyes were very
glassy and his speech was slow and deliberate." When asked whether he had had anything to drink,
Timm replied that he had. Streubel administered field sobriety tests, determined that Timm was
operating under the influence of intoxicants and arrested him. Timm was transported to the Neenah
police department where he was administered a breath test resulting in a .16% blood alcohol
concentration.
f4. The State filed a criminal complaint against Timm on September 7,2001, charging him with OWI,
second offense, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, second
offense. Timm filed a number of pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence alleging that
Streubel lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain him. Following a motion hearing on October 24, 2001,
the trial court denied Timiris motion to suppress. Timm subsequently pled guilty to the OWI offense. He
now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
Tf5. In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Eckart, 203 Wis. 2d 497, 518, 553 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1996).
However, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found is a question of law that we
decide without deference to the circuit court. State v. Patricia A.P., 195 Wis. 2d 855, 862, 537 N.W.2d
47 (Ct. App. 1995).
^[6. The stop of a vehicle and the detention of its passengers constitute a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; however, there are situations in which an
investigative stop may be constitutionally permissible when prompted by an officer's suspicion that the
occupants have committed a crime. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 675, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987). For an
investigatory stop to be valid, a law enforcement officer must reasonably suspect, in light of his or her
experience, that some kind of criminal activity has taken or is taking place. State v. Richardson, 156
Wis.2d 128, 139,456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). Whether an officer's suspicion justifies an investigative stop
involves an objective test. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 675. "Law enforcement officers may only infringe on
the individual's interest to befreeof a stop and detention if they have a suspicion grounded in specific,
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articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts, that the individual has committed a crime."
Id. An "inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" will not suffice. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,27(1968)).
f7. Reasonableness is measured against an objective standard taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d at 139. The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is
a commonsense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police
officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience. State v. Jackson, 147 Wis.2d
824, 831,434 N.W.2d 386 (1989).
^[8. Before turning to the merits of Timm's appeal, we turnfirstto his challenge to the State's
characterization of the facts. In its appellate brief, the State contends that Streubel had a reasonable
suspicion that Timm violated Wis. Stat. §346.04(2) by failing to obey the "road closed" and "local traffic
only" signs. Section 346.04(2) requires motorists to obey posted traffic signs unless directed by an
officer. In support of its argument, the State indicates that Streubel "observed Timm proceed enter [sic]
a construction area, pass through that area, then exit the construction area." From this, the State argues
that Timm used the construction area "as if it were a normal street open to regular public traffic."
f 9. However, the State fails to provide any citation to the record to corroborate the fact that Timm exited
the construction zone prior to being pulled over by Streubel. Such a failure is a violation of Wis. Stat.
Rule 809.19(3), which requires a respondent's brief to comply with subsec. (1), which, in turn, requires
"a statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate references to the
record." Rule809.19(l)(d). This failure is particularly offensive in this case because the State's
representation, if true, would likely result in our affirming the trial court's ruling. However, based on our
independent review of the record, we find no indication that Streubel observed Timm exit the
construction zone. Moreover, the State did not argue this point before the trial court; nor did the trial
court rely on it in arriving at its decision. We admonish the State to be more circumspect in the future.
^flO. Following the hearing, the trial court made the following findings:
[T]his stop took place about one o'clock in the morning. Both sides are in
agreement that there were signs posted in this construction site, that the signs
said "road closed, local traffic only," that there were barricades up, and that the
defendant in this case went around the barricades and proceeded down the road.
Although I guess there was an opening that one could do that.
[Timm] was ultimately cited for failing to obey a sign and going into a
construction zone, but the fact that the defendant in this case was not speeding,
was not swerving, had the appropriate equipment on his car is fine, but he did
go into an area that was posted "road closed, open to local traffic only" or for
local traffic only. I think the officer because of the time, because of the day of
the week, certainly had the right to stop the vehicle to determine whether or not
he did fit one of those exceptions to being on the road.
As noted earlier, the trial court did not make a finding that Timm exited or "passed through" the
construction zone. Rather, the court determined that Timm's entry into a construction zone open to
"local traffic only," coupled with the time of day and the day of the week, was sufficient to provide a
reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime.
f 11. It is undisputed that the roadway was not closed to traffic. Rather, it was open, but only to local

Page 4 of4

No. 02-0162

traffic. Other than entering the controlled area during the early morning hours of a weekend day, the
State did not argue, and the trial court did notfind,that any other evidence suggested possible
wrongdoing by the operator of the vehicle. Under these facts, we disagree with the trial court's
conclusion that Streubel had reasonable suspicion to believe that Timm had committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime or forfeiture offense.
1(12. This case presents a classic example of a stop based upon the "unparticularized suspicion or hunch"
condemned by Terry and Guzy. We do not doubt that drivers sometimes violate "local traffic only"
regulations in construction zones at all times of the day or night. But such generalized suspicion does
not translate into unbridled police authority to stop and detain all vehicles entering into such areas. In
such a situation, the police must accumulate additional information which transforms the initial "hunch"
into "reasonable suspicion" before a Terry stop is permitted. Here, had Streubel waited and continued to
observe Timm's vehicle, he may have acquired additional information warranting a Terry stop, i.e.,
Timm exiting the construction area. But he did not.
CONCLUSION
f 13. We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop
Timm's vehicle. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
By the Court, -Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1 )(b)4.
1 This opinion is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. §752.3 l(2)(c) (1999-2000). All statutory
references are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.
2 Streubel testified that Main Street was under construction from Green Bay Road to the new overpass,
Streubel encountered Timm on Main Street as he crossed Lake Street. Streubelfinallypulled Timm over
on Harrison Street below the overpass. The record indicates that Harrison Street had a gravel surface,
was not paved and was still in the process of being completed.
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